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1.  Introduction  
In response to slow progress in the Doha Round, Asian countries have accelerated 
bilateral and regional trade initiatives. While global free trade is the ultimate goal, many 
countries strive not to be left out of the recent wave of free-trade agreements (FTAs). 
Negotiations for two major FTAs in the region – Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and 
Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) – are in progress. Japan joined the 
Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) negotiations in July 2013 as the 12th member, and Korea 
has decided to join TPP negotiations and has started engaging in consultations with the 
TPP members. RCEP was launched in November 2012 and negotiations among 10 
ASEAN countries and their six FTA partners started in May 2013. Both TPP and RCEP 
are open to new members, and some other Asian countries are expected to join TPP in the 
relatively near future. Over the longer term, there is a strong possibility that enlarged TPP 
and/or enlarged RCEP will lead to the creation of a Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific 
(FTAAP). 
Using a global dynamic computable general equilibrium (CGE) model, we evaluate 
the welfare and sectoral output effects of Asian-track and three TPP-track scenarios. In 
Scenario 1 (Asian-track), an RCEP agreement is presumed to be implemented over the 
2017-2025 period and FTAAP over the 2023-2030 period. In Scenario 2-A (TPP-track A), 
we assume that the 12 countries that are currently negotiating a TPP agreement plus Korea 
(TPP-13) will implement a trade accord over the period 2015-22. 1  Three additional 
countries – Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand – are assumed to join the TPP in 2018 
and complete preferential liberalization with the TPP-13 countries by 2025. Finally, it is 
hypothesized that FTAAP is implemented during 2023-2030 as in Scenario 1. Scenario 2-
B (TPP-track B) adds an additional assumption that productivity of Japan’s agricultural 
sectors increases by 1% per annum starting in 2016, resulting from its policy reforms. In 
Scenarios 1, 2-A and 2-B, we assume that rice is excluded from trade liberalization in 
RCEP, TPP and FTAAP. In Scenario 2-C (TPP-track C), we assume that tariffs on rice are 
                                                 
1 Although the twelve negotiating countries are likely to sign a TPP agreement first, Korea is expected 
to be approved as a new member in a relatively short period thereafter. 
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cut by 50% in FTAAP over the implementation period to examine the sensitivity of the 
tariff cut on the rice sector in Japan. 
A number of studies have quantified the effects of various FTAs in the Asia-Pacific 
region using a CGE model (e.g., Itakura and Lee, 2012; Kawai and Wignaraja, 2008; Lee 
et al., 2009; Li and Whalley, 2012; Petri, Plummer and Zhai, 2012ab). While Petri et al.’s 
(2012b) study was the first to examine the effects of Asian-track and Trans-Pacific-track, 
RCEP had not been launched at the time of their writing. As a result, the Asian-track of a 
China-Japan-Korea FTA, followed by ASEAN+3 FTA (EAFTA) and FTAAP in their 
study is no longer realistic. One of our aims is to construct FTA sequences that are 
reasonable estimates of the future sequences of region-wide FTAs in the Asia-Pacific. 
Another goal of this paper is to show that agricultural policy reforms in Japan 
would be indispensable to avoid sharp reductions in output of many agricultural and food 
products resulting from region-wide FTAs. We will not know whether any agricultural 
products will be exempted from tariff liberalization until an agreement is reached. 
However, we assume that rice will be excluded in three of the four policy scenarios 
because Japan is unlikely to join TPP without an exclusion of rice. 
An overview of the model and data is given in the next section, followed by 
descriptions of the baseline and policy scenarios in section 3. In section 4 assessments of 
welfare and sectoral output effects under each policy scenario are offered. Concluding 
remarks are provided in the final section. 
 
2.  Analytical Framework and Data 
2.1  Overview of the Dynamic GTAP Model 
The numerical simulations undertaken for this study are derived from the dynamic 
GTAP model, described in detail by Ianchovichina and McDougall (2001) and Walmsley 
and Ianchovichina (2012). This model extends the comparative static framework of the 
standard GTAP model developed by Hertel (1997) to the dynamic framework by 
incorporating international capital mobility and capital accumulation. The dynamic GTAP 
model allows international capital mobility and capital accumulation, while it preserves all 
the features of the standard GTAP, such as constant returns to production technology, 
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perfectly competitive markets, and product differentiation by countries of origin, in 
keeping with the so-called Armington assumption.2  At the same time, it enhances the 
investment theory by incorporating international capital mobility and ownership. In this 
way it captures important FTA effects on investment and wealth that are missed by a static 
model. 
In the dynamic GTAP model, each of the regions is endowed with fixed physical 
capital stock owned by domestic firms. The physical capital is accumulated over time with 
new investment. This dynamics are driven by net investment, which is sourced from 
regional households’ savings. The savings in one region are invested directly in domestic 
firms and indirectly in foreign firms, which are in turn reinvested in all regions. The 
dynamics arising from positive savings in one region is related to the dynamics from the 
net investment in other regions. Overall, at the global level, it must hold that all the savings 
across regions are completely invested in home and overseas markets. 
In the short run, an equalization of the rates of return seems unrealistic, and there 
exist well-known empirical observations for “home bias” in savings and investment. These 
observations suggest that capital is not perfectly mobile, causing some divergence in the 
rates of return across regions. The dynamic GTAP model allows inter-regional differences 
in the rates of return in the short run, which will be eventually equalized in the very long 
run. It is assumed that differences in the rates of return are attributed to the errors in 
investors’ expectations about the future rates of return. During the process, these errors are 
gradually adjusted to the actual rate of return as time elapses, and eventually they are 
eliminated and a unified rate of return across regions can be attained. Income accruing 
from the ownership of the foreign and domestic assets can then be appropriately 
incorporated into total regional income. 
Participating in an FTA could lead to more investment from abroad. Trade 
liberalization often makes prices of goods in a participating country lower due to removal 
                                                 
2 See Armington (1969). The model uses a nested CES structure, where at the top nested level, each 
agent chooses to allocate aggregate demand between domestically produced goods and an aggregate 
import bundle, while minimizing the overall cost of the aggregate demand bundle. At the second level, 
aggregate import demand is allocated across different trading partners, again using a CES specification, 
wherein the aggregate costs of imports are minimized. 
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of tariffs, creating an increase in demand for the goods. Responding to the increased 
demand, production of the goods expands in the member country. The expansion of 
production is attained by using more intermediate inputs, labor, capital, and other primary 
factor inputs. These increased demands for production inputs raise the corresponding 
prices, wage rates, and rental rates. Higher rental rates are translated into higher rates of 
return, attracting more investment from both home and foreign countries. 
 
2.2  Data, aggregation, and initial tariffs 
In this study we employ the GTAP database version 8.1, which has a 2007 base 
year and distinguishes 129 countries/regions and 57 sectors (Narayanan et al., 2012). For 
the purposes of the present study, the data has been aggregated to 22 countries/regions and 
32 sectors, as shown in Table 1. Foreign income data are obtained from the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF)’s Balance of Payments Statistics, which are used to track 
international capital mobility and foreign wealth. The values of key parameters, such as 
demand, supply and CES substitution elasticities, are based upon previous empirical 
estimates. The model calibration primarily consists of calculating share and shift 
parameters to fit the model specifications to the observed data, so as to be able to 
reproduce a solution for the base year.  
The sectoral tariff rates for the 22 countries/regions in 2007 are summarized in 
Table 2. There are striking differences in the tariff structures across the countries/regions. 
Singapore is duty free with the exception of alcohol and tobacco. The exceptionally high 
tariff rate on rice in Japan stands out. The tariff rates in a number of other agricultural and 
food products in Japan are also high, as well as in Korea and India. With the exception of 
Australia, New Zealand and Chile, the tariff rates on some agricultural and food products 
are also relatively high in other regions, such as sugar in the United States, Russia and the 
EU, dairy products and meats in Canada, and rice in the Philippines. In manufacturing the 
tariff rates on textiles and apparel are relatively high in all regions except China, Singapore, 
Chile and the EU. The tariff rate on motor vehicles exceeds 20% in Thailand, Vietnam and 
India. 
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Ad valorem tariff equivalents of nontariff barriers (NTBs) in nine services sectors 
are computed as weighted averages of the gravity-model estimates of Wang et al. (2009) 
and the values employed by the Michigan Model of World Production and Trade (e.g. 
Brown, Kiyota and Stern, 2010). There are even greater variations in tariff equivalents of 
NTBs in services than in commodities. 
 
3.  The Baseline and Policy Scenarios 
3.1  The Baseline Scenario  
In order to evaluate the effects of region-wide FTAs in the Asia-Pacific, the 
baseline scenario is first established, showing the path of each of the 22 economies/regions 
over the period 2007-2030. The baseline contains information on macroeconomic variables 
as well as expected policy changes. The macroeconomic variables in the baseline include 
projections for real GDP, gross investment, capital stocks, population, skilled and unskilled 
labor, and total labor. Real GDP projections were obtained from IMF’s World Economic 
Outlook Database. The data on gross fixed capital formation were acquired from the 
IMF’s IFS Online. Projections for population were taken from the U.S. Census Bureau’s 
International Data Base, while those for labor were obtained from International Labor 
Organisation (ILO)’s Economically Active Population Estimates and Populations. 
The projections for population, investment, skilled labor and unskilled labor 
obtained for over 150 countries were aggregated, and the growth rates were calculated to 
obtain the macroeconomic shocks describing the baseline. Changes in the capital stocks 
were not imposed exogenously, but were determined endogenously as the accumulation of 
projected investment. Any changes in real GDP not explained by the changes in 
endowments are attributed to technological change. 
In addition, policy projections are also introduced into the baseline. The policies 
included in the baseline are those which are already agreed upon and legally binding, 
including the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA), the ASEAN-China, ASEAN-Korea, 
ASEAN-Japan, ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand, ASEAN-India, EU-Korea, and Korea-US 
FTAs. It is assumed that tariffs are cut by 80% among the member countries of the FTAs 
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that are being implemented. Rice is excluded from tariff liberalization in FTAs that include 
Japan or Korea as a member country. 
 
3.2  Policy Scenarios 
Welfare and sectoral output effects of region-wide FTAs and their implications for 
Japan and Emerging Asia are to be evaluated in this study. The following four scenarios, as 
well as the global trade liberalization (GTL) scenario, are designed and summarized in 
Table 3. 
Scenario 1 (Asian-track): RCEP over the period 2017-2025 and FTAAP from 2023-2030. 
Rice is excluded from tariff liberalization. 
Scenario 2-A (TPP-track A): TPP-13 over the period 2015-2022, TPP-16 from 2018-2025, 
and FTAAP from 2023-2030. Rice is excluded.  
Scenario 2-B (TPP-track B): Same as Scenario 2-A, except that efficiency on overall 
output for Japan’s agricultural sectors is assumed to increase by 1% per annum from 2016.  
Scenario 2-C (TPP-track C): Same as Scenario 2-B, except that tariffs on rice are cut by 
50% in FTAAP over the implementation period. 
GTL:  Global trade liberalization over the period 2015-2030. 
It is assumed that tariff rates on commodities (except rice where noted) decline 
linearly to zero and tariff equivalents of NTBs in services are reduced by 20 percent during 
the periods in consideration among the member countries. In addition, time cost of trade – 
e.g. shipping delays arising from regulatory procedures and inadequate infrastructure – is 
assumed to fall by 20 percent among them.3  
Petri, Plummer and Zhai (2012b) also compare Asian-track and TPP-track FTAs. 
There are, however, three notable differences between their scenarios and ours. First, we 
allow FTAAP to start before the full implementation of RCEP or TPP. Since both of these 
region-wide FTAs are open to new members, there is a relatively strong possibility that 
they would include all the APEC members before they are fully implemented. Second, 
                                                 
3 For a detailed analysis of time cost of trade, see Minor and Hummels (2011). 
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while Petri et al. (2012b) assume that a China-Japan-Korea (CJK) FTA is implemented 
first in the Asian-track, we assume that an RCEP agreement would be reached roughly at 
the same time as a CJK FTA. This is because there are high political tensions, including 
territorial disputes, between China and Japan, as well as between Japan and Korea. Such 
disputes and tensions represent an additional barrier that must be surmounted in 
negotiations aiming to fashion an FTA. Third, mainly because RCEP negotiations started 
more than three years after the first round of TPP negotiations in Melbourne, we assume 
that it takes a few years longer for RCEP to reach an agreement than TPP.  
Three caveats should be borne in mind when interpreting the results presented in 
the next section. First, investment liberalization among the member countries is not 
considered because it requires data on foreign direct investment (FDI) flows by source and 
host countries and industry, which are unavailable. A challenging extension of the paper 
would be to endogenize FDI flows to consider attraction of these flows to developing 
member countries, which may have a significant impact, as were the cases for Mexico 
joining NAFTA in 1994 and Spain and Portugal joining the EU in 1986. Second, NTBs in 
manufacturing are not incorporated in this study due to a lack of reliable empirical 
estimates. NTBs also exist in a number of manufacturing sectors, including automobiles, 
pharmaceutical products, and some food products. In these products regulatory and other 
barriers, such as stringent standards and testing and certification procedures, exist. Thus, 
reductions of NTBs in manufacturing are expected to enlarge the benefits of the FTAs. 
Third, we do not incorporate compliance costs associated with rules of origin (ROOs), nor 
the cost-mitigating effects arising from consolidating FTAs. As smaller FTAs are 
consolidated, the harmful “noodle bowl” effects – caused by different FTAs having 
different ROOs and varying coverage – can be mitigated. The compliance cost eventually 
becomes zero when all countries participate in a trade agreement because there will be no 
ROOs under global trade liberalization (GTL). These issues are left for future research. 
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4.  Empirical Findings 
4.1  Welfare Effects 
Economic welfare is largely determined by four factors: (1) allocative efficiency, 
(2) the terms of trade, (3) the contribution to equivalent variation (EV) of change in the 
price of capital investment goods, and (4) the contribution to EV of change in equity 
owned by a region. The fourth factor is determined by the change in equity income from 
ownership of capital endowments, and it can be further decomposed into three parts: a 
change in the domestic capital stock, a change in household income earned on capital 
abroad, and a change in the domestic capital owned by foreigners. 
With respect to these four factors, the direction of a welfare change may be 
summarized as follows. The allocative efficiency effect is generally positive for members 
of region-wide FTAs. This effect is particularly large for a country with high average 
initial tariffs. However, it may become negative when the extent of trade diversion is 
considerably large in FTAs with relatively low intraregional trade. The terms-of-trade 
effect is usually positive for the members with low average initial tariffs and negative for 
those with high initial tariffs. An increase in the price of capital investment goods 
generally raises welfare. A welfare change resulting from a change in the equity holdings 
is positive if the sum of the region’s foreign income receipts and an increase in the 
domestic capital stock is greater than the foreign income payment, and vice versa. 
The welfare results for the five policy scenarios, as percentage point deviations in 
equivalent variation from the baseline for the years 2020, 2025 and 2030, are summarized 
in Table 4. Under Scenario 1 (Asian-track), the welfare level of all RCEP countries 
increases in 2020-2030, whereas that of all APEC members increases in 2030. The welfare 
gains in 2025 for RCEP countries range from 1.2% (Japan) to 4.3% (Korea), while those in 
2030 for the APEC members range from 0.1% (United States) to 4.9% (Korea). The 
economic welfare of several nonmember regions decreases slightly in 2020 and/or 2025. 
Taiwan is not a member of the RCEP grouping, and its welfare is predicted to fall by 0.5% 
in 2020 largely because the shares of its trade with ASEAN+6 countries is high (about 
60% of its total trade) and the extent of trade diversion would be relatively large. Thus, it 
has a strong incentive to convince the other APEC members of the benefits of FTAAP, as 
 10
its welfare is projected to increase by 4.5% in 2030 when FTAAP is assumed to be fully 
implemented. 
In Scenario 2-A (TPP-track A), economic welfare of prospective TPP-16 countries 
increases during 2020-2030. The welfare gains in 2025 for TPP-16 countries range from 
0.2% (United States) to 2.9% (Vietnam), whereas those in 2030 for the APEC members 
range from 0.2% (United States) to 4.7% (Korea). Eight East Asian economies, namely 
Japan, Korea, Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam, are 
both RCEP and probable TPP-16 members. Other than Malaysia and the Philippines, these 
economies’ welfare gains in 2025 are smaller under the TPP-track than under the Asian-
track, which is mainly caused by substantially smaller trade with TPP-16 members than 
trade with RCEP members.4 However, the differences in welfare gains between the two 
tracks are relatively small in 2030 and are sensitive to assumptions on the baseline 
scenario.5 
In Scenario 2-B (TPP-track B), productivity of Japan’s agricultural sectors is 
assumed to increase by one percent per annum starting in 2016, resulting from its policy 
reform. The Japanese government has approved a plan to phase out gentan – the system 
that has paid farmers to reduce rice crops since 1971 – by 2018. In addition, in December 
2013 the Japanese Diet enacted a bill to consolidate small plots of agricultural land.6 Under 
this law, prefectural governments will establish farmland banks. The banks will borrow 
pieces of farmland from small-scale part-time farmers or those who have stopped farming, 
and consolidate and lease them to large-scale farmers. Both phasing out gentan and 
consolidation of agricultural land are expected to improve productivity of agricultural 
sectors in Japan. Other prospective reforms include provisions of direct payments to full-
time farmers, abolitions of subsidies to part-time farmers, lessening regulations on 
corporations to participate in agricultural production, and reforming the distribution system 
                                                 
4 Itakura and Lee (2012) find similar results. 
5 In the present study, tariffs are cut by 80% among the members of the FTAs included in the baseline 
scenario. Lee and Itakura (2013) show that more countries benefit from the TPP-track when tariffs are 
cut by 100% among the members of the FTAs included in the baseline. 
6 Honma (2010) states that agricultural land per farm in Japan is about 1/120 of that in the United States 
and between 1/45 and 1/20 of that in European countries. 
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of agricultural inputs and final products. It remains to be seen to what extent the Japanese 
government would carry out agricultural policy reforms. 
If the Japanese government is successful in accomplishing reforms and improving 
productivity of its agricultural sectors, then Japan’s welfare gains in 2030 are projected to 
increase by 0.4 percentage point (from 1.6% to 2.0%) compared with the case of no 
reforms. Other countries’ economic welfare is virtually unchanged. Considering that 
agriculture accounted for only 1.1% of Japan’s GDP in 2012, an increase of 0.4 percentage 
point in welfare is large. Lower prices of agricultural products would reduce intermediate 
input cost of processed food sectors and some services sectors. 
In Scenarios 1, 2-A and 2-B, we assume that rice is excluded from tariff 
liberalization in RCEP, TPP and FTAAP. In Scenario 2-C (TPP-track C), we assume that 
tariffs on rice are cut by 50% (from 422% to 211%) in FTAAP over the implementation 
period to examine the sensitivity of the tariff cut on the rice sector in Japan. This would 
further increase Japan’s welfare gain in 2030 by 0.1 percentage point (from 2.0% to 2.1%).  
 
4.2   Sectoral Output Adjustments in Japan 
 
Structural adjustments and resource reallocations result from trade accords. The FTA 
groupings and differences in the initial tariff rates across sectors and member countries 
play a critical role in determining the direction of the adjustments in sectoral output. Other 
factors that affect the magnitude and direction of output adjustments for each product 
category include the import-demand ratio, the export-output ratio, the share of each 
imported intermediate input in total costs, and the elasticity of substitution between 
domestic and imported products.7  
                                                 
7  A sector with a larger import-demand ratio generally suffers from proportionately larger output 
contraction through greater import penetration when initial tariff levels are relatively high. In contrast, a 
sector with a higher export-output ratio typically experiences a larger extent of output expansion, as a 
result of the removal of tariffs in the member countries. The share of imported intermediate inputs in the 
total cost of a downstream industry (e.g., the share of imported textiles in the cost of the apparel 
industry) would evidently affect the magnitude and direction of output adjustments in the latter sector. 
Finally, the greater the values of substitution elasticities between domestic and imported products, the 
greater the sensitivity of the import-domestic demand ratio to changes in the relative price of imports, 
thereby magnifying the effects of FTAs. 
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Table 5 presents the sectoral output effects for Japan for the year 2030. The change 
in rice output is rather small under Scenarios 1, 2-A and 2-B because the tariff rate on this 
commodity is assumed to be fixed. Output of other grains, sugar, livestock, meats and 
dairy products contracts considerably under Scenarios 1 and 2-A as well as under GTL, in 
which productivity in all sectors is fixed. When agricultural productivity in Japan is 
assumed to increase by 1% per annum in Scenario 2-B, the extent of contraction would be 
reduced significantly except for dairy products. In the meat sector output changes become 
positive, suggesting that appropriate policy reforms would sufficiently strengthen the 
competitiveness of Japan’s livestock and meat sectors. 
Under both the Asian-track and the TPP-track, the manufacturing and services 
sectors in Japan generally increase with the exception of apparel, electronic equipment, 
other transport equipment and air transport. The contraction of the apparel sector results 
from the removal of relatively high tariffs and sharp increase in imports from China and a 
number of ASEAN countries. The reduction in output of electronic equipment in Japan 
under TPP, RCEP and FTAAP is also reported by Petri et al. (2014) and might result from 
fragmentation of production processes and substantial increase in imports of electronic 
parts and components from emerging Asia, particularly Indonesia, Thailand and Vietnam.8 
For similar reasons, output of other transport equipment contracts in Japan. Finally, the 
reduction in air transport appears to suggest that Japan’s comparative advantage in sea 
transport and the resulting substitution from air transport to sea transport. 
 
5.  Conclusion  
In this paper, we have used the dynamic GTAP model to investigate how region-
wide FTAs in Asia might affect the welfare changes and sectoral output adjustments. The 
tariff rate on rice is assumed to be fixed in three of the four policy scenarios. A comparison 
of the Asian-track (RCEP followed by FTAAP) and the TPP-track (TPP-13 followed by 
                                                 
8 The sectoral output effects for countries/regions other than Japan are available upon request from the 
corresponding author. Kimura and Obashi (2010, 2011) show the increasing importance in machinery 
parts and components in intra-East Asian trade, particularly in electronic parts and components. In 2007, 
17% of total intra-regional merchandise exports are accounted for by ICT-related parts and components 
in East Asia, whereas the corresponding figures are only 2-3% in Europe and the Americas (Kimura and 
Obashi, 2010, p. 10). 
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enlarged TPP and FTAAP) suggest that more Asian countries are expected to realize larger 
welfare gains under the Asian-track. This is largely caused by the fact that most Asian 
countries have greater trade shares with RCEP countries than with prospective TPP-16 
countries. However, the differences in welfare gains between the two tracks are relatively 
small in 2030 and are sensitive to assumptions on the baseline scenario.  
In the second TPP-track scenario, it is assumed that Japan’s agricultural policy 
reforms would result in an increase in productivity of its agricultural sectors by 1% per 
annum. Under this scenario, Japan’s overall welfare gains are expected to increase by 0.4 
percentage point relative to the case where productivity is fixed. In the third TPP-track 
scenario, tariffs on rice are cut in half during the implementation of FTAAP. It is shown 
that this would further increase Japan’s welfare gain in 2030 by 0.1 percentage point. 
With respect to sectoral output adjustments, there appear to be no significant 
differences between the Asian-track and TPP-track for countries that are both members of 
RCEP and TPP-16. In Japan, output of many agricultural and processed food sectors 
contract, while that of many manufacturing and services sectors expand with the exception 
of apparel, electronic equipment, other transport equipment and air transport. In many 
emerging Asian countries, output of textiles, apparel, machinery, electronic equipment and 
other transport equipment would increase. 
When Japan’s agricultural productivity is assumed to increase by 1% per annum, 
the extent of output contraction of agricultural and processed food sectors in the country 
would be reduced significantly except for dairy products. Output changes in some of the 
products, such as meats and other crops, are predicted to become positive, indicating the 
beneficial effects of agricultural policy reforms in Japan. Finally, when tariffs on rice are 
cut in half in the third TPP-track scenario, rice output in Japan is projected to fall by 13%. 
This contrasts with the 53% decline in rice production under the global trade liberalization 
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Table 1: Regional and sectoral aggregation 
 
A. Regional aggregation     
  Country/region Corresponding economies/regions in the GTAP 8 database    
 1 Japan Japan 
 2 China China, Hong Kong 
 3 Korea Korea 
 4 Taiwan Taiwan 
 5 Singapore Singapore 
 6 Indonesia Indonesia 
 7 Malaysia Malaysia 
 8 Philippines Philippines 
 9 Thailand Thailand 
 10 Vietnam Vietnam 
 11 Rest of ASEAN Cambodia, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Myanmar, rest of  
   Southeast Asia 
 12 India India 
 13 Australia Australia 
 14 New Zealand New Zealand 
 15 United States United States 
 16 Canada Canada 
 17 Mexico Mexico 
 18 Chile Chile 
 19 Peru Peru 
 20 Russia Russian Federation 
 21 EU-28 Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, 
Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, 
Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom 




Table 1 (continued) 
 
B. Sectoral aggregation     
  Sector Corresponding commodities/sectors in the GTAP 8 database    
 1 Rice Paddy rice, processed rice 
 2 Other grains Wheat, cereal grains nec 
 3 Sugar Sugar, sugar cane and sugar beet 
 4 Other crops Vegetables and fruits, oil seeds, plant-based fibers, crops nec 
 5 Livestock Cattle, sheep and goats, animal products nec, raw milk, wool  
 6 Fossil fuels Coal, oil, gas 
 7 Natural resources Forestry, fishing, minerals nec 
 8 Meats Cattle, sheep, goat, and horse meat products, meat products nec 
 9 Dairy products Dairy products 
 10 Other food products Vegetable oils, food products nec, beverages and tobacco products 
 11 Textiles Textiles 
 12 Apparel Wearing apparel, leather products 
 13 Wood and paper Wood products, paper products, publishing 
 14 Petroleum products Petroleum, coal products 
 15 Chemical products Chemical, rubber, plastic products 
 16 Steel Iron and steel 
 17 Nonferrous metal Nonferrous metal 
 18 Metal products Fabricated metal products  
 19 Machinery Machinery and equipment 
 20 Electronic equipment Electronic equipment 
 21 Motor vehicles Motor vehicles and parts 
 22 Other transport equip. Transport equipment nec 
 23 Other manufactures Mineral products nec, manufactures nec 
 24 Construction and utilities Construction, electricity, gas manufacture and distribution, water 
 25 Trade Trade 
 26 Sea transport Sea transport 
 27 Air transport Air transport 
 28 Other transport Other transport 
29 Communication Communication 
30 Financial services Insurance, financial services nec 
 31 Other private services Business services, recreation and other services 
 32 Government services Public administration and defense, education, health services    
Source: GTAP database, version 8.1. 




Table 2: Tariff rates on merchandise imports and tariff equivalents of nontariff barriers on services, 2004 (%) 
Sector
1 Rice 421.7 1.4 4.7 0.2 0.0 8.6 39.7 49.9 5.8 13.5 2.6
2 Other grains 27.4 1.7 5.2 2.9 0.0 2.6 0.0 5.1 2.5 4.2 1.5
3 Sugar 39.4 0.1 3.6 10.4 0.0 20.4 0.0 21.7 12.1 16.5 6.2
4 Other crops 4.6 2.8 51.2 8.2 0.0 2.2 10.6 6.7 13.1 13.0 8.0
5 Livestock 5.7 15.7 6.5 5.2 0.0 3.0 0.1 5.9 4.7 1.3 3.3
6 Fossil fuels 0.0 0.1 2.7 1.0 0.0 0.0 2.2 3.0 0.0 1.1 1.1
7 Natural resources 0.2 0.3 1.1 1.5 0.0 1.0 0.2 2.9 1.5 2.1 2.9
8 Meats 24.1 4.7 29.3 16.3 0.0 3.6 0.3 15.8 15.5 18.8 4.7
9 Dairy products 53.3 6.4 45.0 11.2 0.0 4.3 0.8 1.8 9.1 17.3 7.1
10 Other food products 9.9 4.7 30.6 14.3 0.6 7.0 10.6 5.6 14.6 16.3 10.9
11 Textiles 6.3 5.3 8.4 7.6 0.0 7.5 7.1 7.2 6.6 28.8 7.7
12 Apparel 9.6 4.0 8.9 8.1 0.0 7.5 7.9 9.1 20.2 19.1 11.6
13 Wood and paper 1.0 1.7 1.9 0.9 0.0 3.1 4.6 5.0 5.8 7.8 5.3
14 Petroleum products 0.3 4.5 4.4 2.6 0.0 0.7 0.4 2.4 9.2 14.7 8.4
15 Chemical products 1.0 6.1 4.8 3.0 0.0 3.7 3.8 4.0 7.0 4.5 3.8
16 Steel 0.9 3.9 0.3 0.4 0.0 4.1 17.4 2.9 4.1 3.9 2.2
17 Nonferrous metal 0.4 2.8 2.4 1.0 0.0 2.8 3.4 2.0 1.5 0.9 3.6
18 Metal products 0.4 8.2 5.3 6.1 0.0 6.0 8.4 6.5 11.2 10.9 4.1
19 Machinery 0.1 6.1 5.3 3.1 0.0 2.7 2.2 2.4 5.1 4.4 4.5
20 Electronic equipment 0.0 1.2 1.2 1.9 0.0 0.6 0.1 0.5 1.5 4.7 6.2
21 Motor vehicles 0.0 14.6 7.2 12.1 0.0 11.9 14.0 11.6 23.6 23.2 19.1
22 Other transport equip. 0.0 2.8 1.2 3.9 0.0 1.8 2.0 3.9 3.8 12.2 7.2
23 Other manufactures 0.6 6.0 6.0 5.0 0.0 6.5 6.7 5.3 8.7 15.8 6.0
24 Construction and utilities 5.0 25.2 13.0 10.8 0.0 64.4 17.4 52.6 44.9 53.7 20.6
25 Trade 22.7 109.6 33.0 28.8 1.3 98.5 36.0 80.2 63.5 82.7 32.5
26 Sea transport 7.6 21.5 15.7 12.6 1.3 67.3 17.6 53.5 40.5 54.4 6.4
27 Air transport 19.5 61.5 29.4 25.4 1.3 91.9 32.1 74.6 58.7 76.7 28.4
28 Other transport 20.2 74.3 30.2 26.1 1.3 93.4 33.0 75.8 59.7 78.0 14.9
29 Communication 17.8 48.1 27.4 23.6 1.3 88.4 30.0 71.5 56.1 73.5 32.8
30 Financial services 17.1 83.3 30.4 27.5 1.5 92.5 30.2 72.6 58.1 74.7 20.0
31 Other private services 16.6 81.2 29.2 26.7 1.5 91.1 29.8 70.8 54.9 73.7 7.3
32 Government services 25.9 84.1 34.3 29.1 2.8 97.8 36.5 76.9 61.5 84.2 24.1
Japan China Korea Taiwan Singapore Indonesia Malaysia Philippines Thailand Vietnam Rest ofASEAN
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Table 2 (continued) 
Sector
1 Rice 39.0 0.0 0.0 1.9 0.0 0.2 5.8 17.7 9.3 8.9 15.9
2 Other grains 98.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 12.2 0.5 8.0 2.4 1.3 9.9
3 Sugar 91.7 0.0 0.0 24.2 0.4 5.1 2.6 2.5 50.1 25.7 15.0
4 Other crops 34.1 0.4 0.0 2.1 0.2 1.3 1.1 8.0 5.7 1.5 8.5
5 Livestock 11.9 0.1 0.0 0.3 16.3 0.5 0.3 6.7 4.3 0.4 3.8
6 Fossil fuels 11.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.4 0.0 0.1 0.0 1.3
7 Natural resources 9.6 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 1.6 0.1 6.9 2.6 0.1 1.5
8 Meats 21.7 0.2 0.8 2.4 31.0 0.7 3.4 10.8 23.8 5.1 19.8
9 Dairy products 31.9 2.1 1.3 15.0 146.0 6.1 0.9 16.3 7.4 1.4 14.0
10 Other food products 79.8 1.6 1.0 2.1 10.9 2.5 1.1 4.0 12.9 1.5 13.1
11 Textiles 15.9 9.1 6.0 7.0 6.5 4.6 3.3 13.5 12.4 2.1 9.6
12 Apparel 13.2 11.7 11.5 9.8 11.7 16.7 3.8 16.3 16.5 3.4 10.0
13 Wood and paper 13.5 3.0 1.3 0.2 0.6 1.6 0.9 5.8 11.3 0.1 5.4
14 Petroleum products 13.9 0.0 0.1 0.7 0.3 0.8 1.7 2.5 4.0 0.2 4.5
15 Chemical products 13.8 1.9 1.5 1.1 0.6 1.3 0.8 6.1 8.7 0.4 4.0
16 Steel 19.0 3.4 1.6 0.2 0.1 2.4 1.2 6.0 3.0 0.1 4.8
17 Nonferrous metal 14.9 0.6 0.9 0.6 0.0 0.6 0.8 4.4 3.9 0.4 1.3
18 Metal products 14.9 4.3 3.0 1.4 1.0 2.8 1.1 7.1 12.1 0.4 6.8
19 Machinery 14.0 2.3 2.5 0.7 0.4 2.8 0.8 5.4 4.4 0.4 4.9
20 Electronic equipment 2.4 0.9 0.9 0.3 0.2 1.4 0.6 5.1 6.0 0.7 3.6
21 Motor vehicles 24.7 12.4 7.2 0.6 1.0 3.5 3.1 7.2 10.6 0.9 9.7
22 Other transport equip. 6.5 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.7 1.6 0.2 8.9 9.3 0.7 4.7
23 Other manufactures 14.7 2.8 2.6 1.2 1.1 3.4 1.1 9.0 12.3 0.6 6.0
24 Construction and utilities 109.7 4.3 1.0 2.3 9.2 40.8 25.8 27.2 52.9 5.6 26.7
25 Trade 153.3 18.2 8.2 6.8 20.7 61.8 33.8 51.0 73.5 12.0 48.2
26 Sea transport 109.6 3.3 3.3 6.8 6.0 38.8 16.7 30.7 48.2 5.4 22.0
27 Air transport 144.1 15.1 5.7 6.8 17.6 56.9 30.2 46.7 68.1 11.1 49.5
28 Other transport 146.1 15.7 6.2 6.8 18.3 58.0 31.0 47.7 69.3 10.3 39.9
29 Communication 139.2 13.4 4.3 6.8 15.9 54.3 28.3 44.4 65.3 9.3 36.6
30 Financial services 139.5 13.5 4.3 7.8 19.8 57.6 27.5 46.4 65.9 8.7 43.3
31 Other private services 137.1 13.5 3.7 7.8 19.2 58.2 26.5 43.8 65.1 9.7 40.5
32 Government services 154.8 23.5 10.2 6.3 17.5 60.3 33.0 47.3 69.7 14.2 45.8
India Australia New Zealand
United 




Sources: Sectors 1-23: GTAP database, version 8.1. Sectors 24-32: averages of the gravity-model estimates of Wang et al. (2009) and the values employed by the 
Michigan Model of World Production and Trade. 
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Table 3: Policy scenarios and assumptions 
2015-16 2017 2018-19 2020-22 2023-25 2026-2030






 1) NTBs on services and logistic time in merchandise trade are cut by 20%.
 2) Rice is excluded from trade liberalization in TPP-13 and TPP-16. Tariffs on rice 
are cut by 50% in FTAAP over the implementation period.
 3) Starting in 2016, efficiency on overall output for sectors 1-5 in Japan increases by 








 RCEP (ASEAN+6 FTA) (2017-2025)
 FTAAP (2023-2030)
 Assumptions: 
 1) NTBs on services and logistic time in merchandise trade are cut by 20%.
 2) Rice is excluded from trade liberalization.
 Assumptions: 
 1) NTBs on services and logistic time in merchandise trade are cut by 20%.
 2) Rice is excluded from trade liberalization.
 3) Starting in 2016, efficiency on overall output (ao) for sectors 1-5 in Japan increases 







 1) NTBs on services and logistic time in merchandise trade are cut by 20%.
 2) Rice is excluded from trade liberalization.
 FTAAP (2023-2030)
  
Note: RCEP: 10 ASEAN members plus China, Japan, Korea, India, Australia and New Zealand. TPP-13: 
Australia, Canada, Brunei, Chile, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, United 
States and Vietnam. TPP-16: TPP-13 plus Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand. 
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Table 4: The welfare effects of region-wide FTAs 
(Percentage deviations in utility from the baseline) 
2020 2025 2030 2020 2025 2030 2020 2025 2030
Japan 0.4 1.2 1.5 0.5 1.1 1.6 0.7 1.3 2.0
China 0.6 1.4 1.6 -0.2 0.5 1.7 -0.2 0.5 1.7
Korea 1.5 4.3 4.9 1.2 2.8 4.7 1.2 2.8 4.7
Taiwan -0.5 0.3 4.5 -0.1 1.4 5.2 -0.1 1.4 5.3
Singapore 0.7 2.2 2.0 0.9 1.8 1.7 0.9 1.8 1.7
Indonesia 0.6 1.9 2.2 0.4 1.5 1.8 0.4 1.5 1.8
Malaysia 0.3 1.4 1.9 0.8 1.5 1.9 0.8 1.5 1.9
Philippines 0.6 1.4 1.6 0.5 1.7 2.2 0.5 1.7 2.2
Thailand 1.0 2.5 2.3 0.5 2.4 2.5 0.5 2.3 2.4
Vietnam 1.2 3.6 4.4 2.1 2.9 3.6 2.0 2.8 3.6
Rest of ASEAN 0.6 2.2 2.9 -0.1 0.7 2.6 -0.1 0.7 2.6
India 1.3 1.5 0.5 -0.1 -0.7 -1.6 -0.1 -0.7 -1.6
Australia 0.8 3.0 3.5 0.3 0.6 0.9 0.3 0.6 0.9
New Zealand 0.3 0.8 1.4 0.7 1.5 1.6 0.7 1.5 1.6
United States -0.1 -0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.2
Canada -0.1 0.3 1.1 0.6 0.8 1.0 0.6 0.8 1.0
Mexico -0.1 0.4 1.2 0.8 1.3 1.3 0.8 1.3 1.3
Chile 0.0 0.4 1.4 0.7 1.5 1.2 0.7 1.5 1.1
Peru 0.0 0.2 0.5 0.1 0.3 0.5 0.1 0.3 0.5
Russia -0.1 0.3 1.1 -0.1 0.3 0.9 -0.1 0.3 0.9
EU-28 -0.1 -0.3 -0.6 0.0 -0.2 -0.6 0.0 -0.2 -0.6
Rest of world -0.1 -0.1 0.2 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 0.0
Scenario 1 (Asian-track) Scenario 2-A (TPP-track A) Scenario 2-B (TPP-track B)
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Table 4 (continued) 
2020 2025 2030 2020 2025 2030
Japan 0.7 1.4 2.1 0.5 0.9 1.3
China -0.2 0.5 1.7 1.1 1.7 2.2
Korea 1.2 2.8 4.7 1.9 3.7 5.5
Taiwan -0.1 1.4 5.3 1.4 2.7 4.1
Singapore 0.9 1.8 1.7 0.8 1.8 3.0
Indonesia 0.4 1.5 1.8 0.9 2.0 3.3
Malaysia 0.8 1.5 1.9 1.1 2.4 3.6
Philippines 0.5 1.7 2.2 0.4 0.3 0.2
Thailand 0.5 2.3 2.4 1.8 3.2 4.1
Vietnam 2.0 2.9 3.6 2.7 4.8 6.9
Rest of ASEAN -0.1 0.7 2.6 0.9 2.3 3.8
India -0.1 -0.7 -1.6 2.3 4.0 4.6
Australia 0.3 0.6 0.9 0.6 1.5 2.8
New Zealand 0.7 1.5 1.6 0.4 0.8 1.3
United States 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0
Canada 0.6 0.8 1.0 0.4 1.0 1.5
Mexico 0.8 1.3 1.3 0.4 0.6 0.7
Chile 0.7 1.5 1.1 0.1 0.3 0.5
Peru 0.1 0.3 0.5 -0.1 -0.2 -0.1
Russia -0.1 0.3 0.9 0.7 2.0 3.1
EU-28 0.0 -0.2 -0.6 0.2 0.4 0.7
Rest of world -0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.9
Scenario 2-C (TPP-track C) Global Trade Liberalization
 
Definitions of scenarios: 
Scenario 1 (Asian-track): RCEP over the period 2017-2025 and FTAAP from 2023-2030. Rice is excluded. Scenario 2-A (TPP-track A): TPP-13 over the 
period 2015-2022, TPP-16 from 2018-2025, and FTAAP from 2023-2030. Rice is excluded. Scenario 2-B (TPP-track B): Same as scenario 2-A, except 
that efficiency on overall output for Japan’s agricultural sectors is assumed to increase by 1% per annum from 2016. Scenario 2-C (TPP-track C): Same as 
scenario 2-B, except that tariffs on rice are cut by 50% in FTAAP over the implementation period. 
Source: Model simulations.  
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Table 5: Japan’s sectoral output adjustments for the year 2030 
(Percentage deviation from the baseline) 
 
Sector 1  2-A 2-B 2-C GTL
Rice -0.3 -0.2 -2.0 -13.3 -53.1
Other grains -36.5 -37.0 -8.0 -7.5 -35.8
Sugar -6.5 -6.6 0.0 0.2 -11.5
Other crops -4.3 -4.3 1.3 0.9 -6.7
Livestock -13.6 -13.8 -0.2 -0.1 -15.6
Fossil fuels -2.0 -2.0 -2.3 -2.4 -1.0
Natural resources 2.3 2.1 2.5 2.5 1.4
Meats -14.1 -14.5 4.2 4.4 -14.5
Dairy products -34.0 -34.2 -27.6 -27.5 -39.4
Other food products 0.4 0.6 1.7 1.9 0.9
Textiles 12.6 13.9 13.3 13.3 17.0
Apparel -4.4 -4.1 -4.0 -4.0 -4.9
Wood and paper 0.0 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.6
Petroleum products 3.8 3.9 3.9 3.8 1.6
Chemical products 3.4 3.0 2.8 2.7 1.1
Steel 2.7 2.2 1.9 1.9 3.5
Nonferrous metal 4.0 5.4 5.1 5.1 1.0
Metal products 1.7 1.8 1.8 1.8 0.6
Machinery 0.9 0.1 -0.4 -0.4 -0.6
Electronic equipment -3.9 -4.0 -4.3 -4.3 -4.1
Motor vehicles 4.4 3.3 2.9 2.9 6.4
Other transport equip. -5.9 -6.8 -7.2 -7.2 -1.4
Other manufactures 2.2 2.8 2.8 2.9 1.0
Construction and utilities 3.7 4.6 5.1 5.1 -0.1
Trade 1.2 1.2 1.6 1.6 0.3
Sea transport 2.7 0.8 0.7 0.7 6.8
Air transport -1.1 -1.8 -1.9 -1.9 -2.4
Other transport 0.9 1.0 1.1 1.1 -0.4
Communication 0.9 0.9 1.1 1.1 0.2
Financial services 0.5 0.4 0.6 0.6 -0.2
Other private services 1.0 1.0 1.2 1.3 0.1
Government services 0.6 0.6 0.8 0.8 0.4
Scenarios
  
Source: Model simulations.  
 
 
